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One method of evaluating the success of management decisions regarding acquisitions is 
to examine equity price movements as the news of the merger is made public.  The price 
movement of the acquiring firm’s equity around the announcement of the acquisition 
indicates if shareholders believe management has acted in their interest.  In the banking 
industry, researchers have found that on average equity values of the acquiring bank do 
not display abnormal positive returns upon announcement, and often display statistically 
significant negative returns.  Another line of research has documented that CEOs are 
better compensated for managing larger organizations, particularly when involved in 
merger activity.  This study investigates the possibility of a linkage between weak firm-
level corporate governance structures at banks and their propensity to make acquisitions 
that produce negative reactions from equity holders.  A commercially-sold governance 
index from Institutional Shareholder Services is used to measure governance strength.  
Acquisition events are from the comprehensive Thomson Reuters SDC merger database 




 with inferior stock market reactions upon announcement of an acquisition.  This result 
should be of interest to regulators as they monitor corporate actions for covert motives, 
and to investors in their investment selection process.  I then explore which aspects of 
corporate governance have the most significant connection to the equity market 
reception.  Surprisingly, a parsimonious index of two factors has the explanatory power 
of the 55 available governance attributes in this bank merger context.  I also show that in 
this dataset, which is composed of US banks purchasing US entities, acquirers with 
stronger (weaker) governance have a propensity to select targets with stronger (weaker) 
governance.  Lastly, for cases in which the target firm is a bank that is publicly held or 
that has an ultimate parent that is publicly held, I investigate whether good governance at 
the target or its parent is associated with more positive movement of the acquirer’s equity 
price at the time of the merger announcement.  The results are robust to the use of a bank 
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Mergers and acquisitions are one method of increasing the size, scope and profit potential 
of a firm.  They can also enhance the prestige and power of the manager who oversees 
the deal.  Theory suggests that shareholders would hire the agents that can produce the 
highest risk-adjusted returns net of compensation and monitoring costs.  Yet the 
academic literature on mergers and acquisitions reveals an intriguing result.  When 
considering publicly traded companies, returns that seem to be associated with the merger 
announcements are solidly positive for the target but are on either side of zero for the 
acquirer, with factors such as industry, public or private ownership, market conditions, 
transaction size, method of payment and country factors sometimes influencing the 
outcome.  Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) characterize the research findings by 
writing, “In fact, acquiring firm shareholders appear to come dangerously close to 
actually subsidizing these transactions.”  When focusing on the banking industry, 
researchers have found that, on average, equity values of an acquiring bank do not 
display abnormal positive returns upon announcement, and often display statistically 




Considering all industries, Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2006) provide the following list of 
some of the possible explanations:  
 
(i) zero returns correspond to “normal” returns in the competitive process 
(Weston, Siu and Johnson, 2001) 
(ii) difficulties exist in measuring announcement returns such as anticipation and 
the relative size of targets (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989) 
(iii) competing bids exist for the target 
(iv) acquirer stock is used as a method of payment (Andrade, Mitchell, Stafford, 
2001) 
(v) negative returns are the result of bad acquisitions attributable to managerial 
hubris or overconfidence (Heaton, 2002; Roll, 1986).   
 
As early as Manne (1965) and continuing through authors such as Roll (1986), Bliss and 
Rosen (2001), Heaton (2002), Cornett et al. (2003), Girma, Thompson and Wright 
(2006), and Harford and Li (2007), researchers have speculated that agents are pursuing 
acquisitions for their own purposes, and despite a lack of compelling financial benefit to 
the acquirer shareholders.  This study seeks to bring together two lines of academic 
research to investigate the question.  The first is the finding that merger announcements 
tend to result in no gain, or worse, for the acquirer.  The second is the research on the 
principal-agent conflict within the framework of corporate governance at the level of the 




Much of the relevant multi-industry research does not include banks.  Some exclude all 
financial companies in order to focus more closely on the tangible side of the economy 
(Bruno and Claessens, 2007).  Some exclude all regulated industries, such as banks and 
utility companies, in order to focus on the unconstrained decisions of market participants 
(Aggarwal et al., 2007 and also Doukas and Petmezas, 2007).  In either case, banks are 
excluded. 
 
Banks provide a compelling industry to study for a variety of reasons:   
 
1) a well-developed and well-regulated banking system is necessary for the further 
development of the financial sector, 
2) one requirement of regulators is to continually improve their understanding of the risks 
that banks are taking, including those associated with mergers and acquisitions,  
3) to some degree the costs of distress or insolvency for banks is ultimately borne by 
taxpayers, 
4) banks are important for the smooth functioning and the growth of the economy in 
countries with well-developed financial markets and are critical in countries with poorly-
developed financial markets,  
5) banks are often more subject to expropriation or self-dealing by the political elite,  
6)  insights gained by studying banks may be applicable to other industries, 





Bank merger and acquisition activity is significantly different from that of other 
industries in several ways.  They tend to be friendlier, with very few hostile takeovers, 
and they tend to be consummated more often than in other industries (Becher, 2000).  
Additionally, they must be approved by dedicated groups of regulators, and if cross-
border they must be approved by regulators in both the home and host countries.  As 
discussed in Amihud et al. (2002) and Buch and DeLong (2004), there is a possibility that 
firms may be motivated to merge in order to change their risk posture relative to the 
market and relative to their pre-merger positioning with regulators.   
 
The study of how corporate governance issues relate to bank merger activity is important 
because of the possibility that the individual self-interest of managers is affecting not 
only shareholder wealth, but also national economic variables such as the level of risk in 
the economy, the pace of development, and taxpayer wealth.  Regulators need to 
continually improve their understanding of, and ability to monitor, the risks that banks 
decide to take.  With these larger constituencies in mind, an investigation into how 
principal-agent issues may be a component of merger and acquisition activity in the 
banking industry is compelling.   
 
The focus of this study is on the acquirer’s decision to enter into the transaction, and how 
the owners of the acquirer fare at announcement.  Therefore I do not pursue the question 
of whether the merger of the two entities into one enterprise creates or destroys value 
relative to the valuations of the two firms as independent entities.  That is an interesting, 




This study brings broad, commercial-quality, firm-level governance data to bear in the 
investigation of bank mergers.  It contributes to the literature by revealing that a linkage 
can be found for banks between weaker corporate governance and poorly received 
merger announcements.  It gives insight to regulators regarding where less constrained 
bank management may be creating larger organizations for their own purposes, and 
therefore be deserving of enhanced scrutiny.  It also highlights to investors the potential 
benefits of using this type of governance data in their investment selection process.  
Additionally, it gives some insight into which components of corporate governance are 
most closely associated with the equity market reception of an acquiring bank’s merger 
announcement.  Furthermore, it shows that when public US banks choose to acquire other 
public US banks, or from a public ultimate parent, banks with stronger (weaker) 
governance have a propensity to select targets with stronger (weaker) governance.  
Lastly, it suggests that when considering acquisitions of banks, stronger governance of 
the target (or its parent) contributes positively to the market reaction as judged by the 
acquirer’s equity value. 
 
This study examines all US bank mergers from 2001 to 2006 for which firm-level 
governance data are available for the acquirer.  An event study methodology is used to 
construct a quantitative measure, the cumulative abnormal return or CAR, of the market 
reaction to the merger announcement.  In order to obtain many of the results in this study, 
the CAR is regressed against the governance data and against control variables that have 
been shown to be meaningful in previous research.  In order to investigate the tendency 
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of acquirers to select targets with similar governance strength, a regression of target 
governance strength against acquirer governance strength and control variables is done. 
 
The organization of the sections below is as follows:  Section 2 is a review of the 
literature.  Section 3 contains a presentation of the hypotheses.  Section 4 is an 
explanation of the methodology.  Section 5 contains a review of the data sources.  The 
results of the investigation of the linkage between governance strength and acquirer 
equity price movements are presented in section 6.   Section 7 is an analysis of the 
various aspects of acquirer corporate governance and an examination of alternate 
measures.  Section 8 is an examination of the role of the target’s governance when the 
target is a bank.  It also contains the results showing that acquirers tend to select targets 
with similar governance strength.  Section 9 contains a robustness check.  The major 
hypotheses of this study are re-examined using a different index to represent the overall 
market.  The conclusion is in section 10.  
 
Throughout this study the words merger and acquisition will be used interchangeably, as 
will the words acquirer and bidder.  Also the words agents and management will be used 
interchangeably.  Since this study focuses only on the wealth effects for the acquirer, and 
not of the target, the words owners, principals, shareholders, and stockholders will also 









In reviewing the literature on the effect on bidder wealth from the announcement of a 
merger, I focus below primarily on research from the year 2000 forward.  Studies before 
2000 tended to use significantly smaller samples, although the results are similar.  Becher 
(2000) and Schmautzer (2006) contain informative reviews of studies before 2000.  The 
effect of the announcement of the intent to merge on shareholder wealth is typically 
studied by applying an event study methodology.  As mentioned above, there is a divide 
in the literature between the research that examines merger activity among the general 
population of business entities and the studies that focus on banks.   
 
Reviewing the academic literature on market reactions to mergers in the general 
population of business entities is a beneficial starting point for several reasons.  First, it 
contains the historical beginnings of this line of research.  As such it addresses 
fundamental issues of methodology.  It also displays the different style options that have 




Second, major findings regarding mergers and acquisitions are generally first made in the 
literature regarding the general population.  Research on bank M&A then can highlight 
differences from the findings for the general population. 
 
Third, there are some differences in governance tendencies between banks and the 
general corporate population.  Bathala et al. (2007) contains an overview of differences.  
An exposure to the literature for the general population of entities involved in mergers 
helps to give meaning to the relevance of these differences. 
 
Fourth, the volume of studies regarding the general population is much larger.  Only 
reviewing the literature on bank-related activity would miss or under represent some 
aspects of this line of inquiry. 
 
Similar to the literature on mergers, there is a divide in the literature regarding corporate 
governance between research focused on the general population and the much smaller 
amount of research focused on banks.  I will review some of the literature on corporate 
governance regarding the general population, focusing on items that I believe will aid in 
giving context to this study regarding banks. 
 
2.1  Literature Regarding the General Population 
 
As mentioned above, CEO and management hubris has been advanced as a possible 
explanation of why acquirers enter into mergers that seem undesirable to their 
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shareholders, as evidenced by a destruction of value at announcement.  In Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997) the authors construct measures of CEO hubris containing such items as 
CEO compensation, CEO media praise, and recent company performance.  They find that 
acquirer shareholder wealth losses increased as their measures of CEO hubris increased.  
The effect was particularly strong if board oversight was weak.  The strength of board 
oversight was measured by the percentage of insiders on the board, if the CEO served as 
the board chair, and the amount of equity holdings of the outside directors. 
 
LaPorta et al. (2002) is an example of research in which the authors use country-level 
governance indicators, often referred to as investor protections, and show that they are 
relevant to corporate valuations and shareholder wealth.  Although this article is not 
directly related to M&A, this country-level approach became used by researchers 
examining mergers involving entities in different countries. 
 
Bris and Cabolis (2003) use country-level measures as an indicator of the quality of 
governance and apply them to cross-border mergers.  Within a country they create 
governance indicators by industry.  Their findings indicate that an entity that forms from 
a merger will tend to adopt the higher governance standard, either from the acquirer’s or 
the target’s country, even though it may not be necessary by law. 
 
Mueller and Yurtoglu (2007) examine mergers grouped by country.  They conclude that 
mergers in continental Europe do more poorly than those in the United States and 
countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand when performance is measured 
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over time.  They suggest that management empire building may be at work given the 
weaker country governance framework in continental Europe as compared to the 
comparison countries.   
 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) were some of the first researchers to use a numeric 
index to represent the quality of governance at an individual company.  The index the 
authors created has become popular with academics investigating corporate governance.  
The authors find that firms with stronger corporate governance have better business 
results, and make fewer acquisitions. 
 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that CEOs with more power over the board of directors 
tend to do larger acquisitions and the acquisitions are received more negatively.  They 
assess CEO power over the board via factors such as CEO membership on the 
nominating committee, if the CEO seems influential in selecting new board members, 
and if the CEO is the also the board chair.  They also find that more powerful CEOs 
receive larger bonuses upon completion of the merger.  
 
In a 2007 study of firms in the United Kingdom, Doukas and Petmezas focused on the 
theme of overconfidence and self-attribution bias.  They used high order acquisition deals 
and insider dealings as indicators of overconfidence.  They were able to find evidence 
supporting the view that overconfident bidders realize lower announcement-related 
returns.  In another study of UK firms, Girma et al. (2006) document the link between 
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firm size and CEO compensation.  The authors find that CEOs are able to increase their 
compensation via acquisitions.   
 
Harford and Li (2007) investigate U.S. acquirers and also show that CEOs receive 
positive compensation effects from mergers.  They find that even in mergers in which 
bidding shareholders are worse off, bidding CEOs are better off three quarters of the 
time. Additionally they find that following a merger, a CEO’s pay and overall wealth 
become insensitive to negative stock performance, but a CEO’s wealth rises in step with 
positive stock performance.  In an interesting comparison, they find that CEOs are not 
rewarded for undertaking major capital expenditures.  The authors also find that 
corporate governance plays a role in CEO compensation within the M&A context.  
Bidding firms with stronger boards relative to the CEO, defined as CEOs with below-
average tenure at the time of the acquisition, retain the sensitivity of their CEOs’ 
compensation to poor performance following the merger.  
 
Bruno and Claessens (2007) find that firm-level indicators were much more helpful in 
revealing the effects of strong or weak corporate governance than country-level 
indicators.  They find that firm-level indicators had a notable relationship with firm 
valuation whereas country-level indicators did not. 
 
In Masulis et al. (2007), firm-level governance indicators are brought to bear on 
shareholder wealth changes upon the announcement of the intent to merge.  The authors 
find that firms with more anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) generate greater destruction of 
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shareholder wealth upon announcement than firms with fewer ATPs.  They also find that 
firms that separate the positions of chairman and CEO earn higher abnormal returns at 
announcement. 
 
Choi and Huang (2008) use similar firm-level ATP data and examine cross-border 
mergers.  Their findings do not confirm the findings of Masilus et al. (2007).  
Unexpectedly they find that firms with higher ATPs had higher cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) at the announcement of the cross-border deals.  This is despite the fact 
that they paid higher premiums for the targets.  There does not yet seem to be a cohesive 
line of reasoning to put these results into context with other research. 
 
2.2  Literature Focused on Banks 
 
In reviewing the literature regarding banks, I first review research that documents the 
tendency for acquirer abnormal returns to be on average near zero or negative, and 
research that highlights related, but not governance, considerations.  I then review articles 
that incorporate issues of bank governance. 
 
As an example of earlier bank merger research, Becher (2000) examines 558 US bank 
merger events from 1980 to 1997 and finds that over a 36-day event window cumulative 
returns to bidders are not significantly different from zero, but over a shorter, 11-day, 




DeLong (2001) finds that bidders involved in mergers that increase corporate focus in 
both geography and activity do not, on average, destroy shareholder wealth upon 
announcement.  Bidders that were not pursuing this degree of focus, and bidders that 
were diversifying, fared worse. 
 
Using a 12-day window, DeLong (2003 (a)) finds that the average returns to acquirers 
involved in US domestic bank mergers are negative and significant.  Interestingly, she 
finds that in domestic bank mergers within countries with equity markets that are less 
well developed than that of the US, the average CAR is higher.  This study is an indicator 
that the diverse and more portfolio-oriented nature of the equity holdings in more 
financially-developed countries may bring the associated effect of more difficulty 
controlling agents and so bring more mergers that reduce acquirer shareholder wealth.   
 
Bank managers seem to learn from previous mergers.  DeLong and DeYoung (2007), 
using 216 mergers between 1987 and 1999, were able to show that bank managers appear 
to learn from the previous mergers in the industry, and make the experiences in later 
years better than in earlier years.   
 
Although the focus of DeLong and DeYoung (2007) is primarily on long-term bank 
accounting results, it also suggests that market participants may be improving their ability 
to evaluate, at announcement date, which mergers will result in improved results over 
time.  In this regard, the authors make the point that the ability of market participants to 
foresee the ultimate effects of the bank merger is low generally.  This learning by 
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observing on the part of market participants is an interesting extension of the work done 
in DeLong (2003 (b)) in which the author shows that market participants display some 
skill in predicting at the time of announcement the long-term benefits of mergers that 
build some types of enterprise focus but not the same skill when evaluating mergers that 
build other types of enterprise focus. 
 
The following literature concerning banks contains aspects of bank corporate governance.  
 
Bliss and Rosen (2001) find that mergers had a positive impact on CEO compensation, 
particularly via the effect of the size of the bank.  They also find that compensation 
generally increased despite negative market reactions to the merger announcement.  
Interestingly, they additionally found that CEOs with more stock-based compensation 
entered into fewer mergers. 
 
Cornett et al. (2003) investigate a possible linkage between governance variables 
surrounding CEO age, CEO equity exposure and incentive compensation, block 
ownership, and board characteristics to CARs resulting from a merger announcement.  
They find a relationship for focusing mergers but not diversifying mergers.  For focusing 
mergers they find an average CAR near zero, and for diversifying mergers a significantly 
negative average CAR. 
 
Hagendorff et al. (2007) review the existing literature on the linkage between the strength 
of corporate governance and bank merger results, and then call for more investigation 
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into the question.  They characterize it as a compelling line of inquiry given the 
dependence on the banking sector for economic well being, and on the opacity of banking 
risk.  It worth noting that their opinions and their call for further research were issued 
before the financial crisis that began in 2008. 
 
Hagendorff et al. (2008) use country-level data and find that acquirers that purchase 
targets in countries with fewer investor protections tend to have less negative CARs at 
announcement.  Although they do not highlight it as such, this result is consistent with 
the governance mechanisms of the acquirer (the party with the stronger governance 
mechanisms) being brought to bear on the combined entity, thereby enhancing the value 
of the combined entity more than if there was little difference in the governance of the 
two parties at the outset. The amount of the value enhancement is greater, the bigger the 
difference in governance between the two parties. 
 
Hagendorff et al. (2009) again use country-level data and investigate whether board 
monitoring of bank management seems to be less attentive when there is a more stringent 
regulatory regime.  They find that board monitoring seems to be more attentive when 
there is a more stringent regulatory regime.  The two oversight entities seem to 









The empirical analysis in this study is primarily designed to test a component of the 
principal-agent hypothesis as it may be functioning in US banks, stated broadly as 
managers will act in their own interests rather than the interest of shareholders if they are 
not monitored and controlled.  Specifically, the manifestation of the principal-agent 
hypothesis examined is that given weaker constraints by shareholders, bank managers 
display a higher propensity to make acquisitions that destroy shareholder value when 
announced.   
 
The benefits to management of the acquirer from making an acquisition are well 
documented in the literature (e.g. Harford and Li, 2007).  Yet in this study I choose to be 
cautious about making a blanket causal assertion between the existence of corporate 
governance mechanisms at a bank and the assumption that shareholders are constraining 
management.  I want to allow for the theoretical possibility that there are some “good” 
corporate cultures or “good” managers that promote both better acquisitions and the use 
of stronger governance mechanisms.  Even with this caution, investigating the linkage 
between governance and acquisitions is compelling because it is reasonable to believe 
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that in some, perhaps most, cases the constraints of the governance mechanism may be 
restraining or influencing management.  At a minimum, strong corporate governance 
mechanisms serve as a signal to investors that either a “good” situation is in place or that 
“bad” managers would be somewhat constrained. 
 
In order to examine the linkage between governance strength and acquirer wealth effects 
at announcement empirically, I create the following testable hypotheses:  
 
H1: Bank mergers tend to destroy shareholder wealth at announcement on average.   
 
A finding in support of this hypothesis would agree with the extant literature. 
 
H2:  Weaker corporate governance at the acquiring firm level is associated with a greater 
destruction of acquirer shareholder wealth at announcement on average. 
 
A finding in agreement with this hypothesis would document that stronger corporate 
governance measures indicate on average a more positive reception of the announcement 
of an acquisition and less destruction of shareholder wealth.  This result would be 
potentially significant to regulators and investors. 
 
Additionally, I seek to build on the rather sparse literature regarding the significance of 




H3:  Acquirers with stronger governance tend to acquire entities with weaker 
governance. 
 
This hypothesis is motivated by the findings in Hagendorff et al. (2008) in which targets 
from countries with fewer investor protections tended to have less negative CARs at 
announcement.  This tendency combines in an intriguing way with the finding in Bris and 
Cabolis (2003) that a combined entity will bring the higher of the two parties’ governance 
standard to the new entity, and with the finding of Bruno and Claessens (2007) that 
stronger firm-level governance leads to higher firm valuation.  In formulating the 
hypothesis in this way I am assuming that 1) there is a benefit to be garnered by seeking a 
merger partner at the opposite end of the governance spectrum, 2) that the motivation to 
garner that potential benefit for acquirer shareholders will be recognizable among the 
other motivations of the principals, and 3) that research findings generated using cross-
border mergers would apply to US domestic mergers. 
 
With similar motivation and foundation I test the following hypothesis: 
 
H4:  Targets with weaker governance relative to the average governance strength of 










An event study methodology is used to evaluate the market reaction on acquirer equity to 
the announcement of the merger.  To briefly review the terminology, the merger 
announcement is the event, and is said to happen on day 0.  An observation window 
measured in number of days is established around the date of the event.  Following 
Masulis et al. (2007) this study uses a 5 day window around the announcement, 2 days 
before the announcement date, day -2, and 2 days after, day +2.   
 
The return that would have been expected during the announcement window if there had 
been no announcement is calculated.  This study follows the literature in using the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to create the expected return.  The CAPM 
parameters alpha and beta are estimated by considering the individual stock and market 
movements during a period 255 trading days in length ending 46 trading days before the 
event.  The CRSP equal-weighted market index is the benchmark market return.  The 
expected individual stock return is compared to the actual return.  The difference is 
designated as the abnormal return, attributable to the event.  This calculation is done on a 
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daily basis for each day in the event window.  The sum of the daily abnormal returns for 
the entire window is called the cumulative abnormal return, or CAR.   
 
  (1)                                              ARit = Rit – (αi + βiRMt)                                         
 








αi and βi are the parameters generated by the CAPM estimation process 
ARit = the abnormal return for stock i on day t 
Rit = return on stock i on day t 
RMt = the return of the market on day t 
CARi = the cumulative abnormal return on stock i for the event 
 
A comprehensive, commercially-marketed, governance index is used to indicate the 
strength of corporate governance.  The governance index value for each company is re-
evaluated annually, and the value for the year of the event is used.  The data provider 
refers to this as the Corporate Governance Quotient, or CGQ.  In equation (3) below, it is 





With the CAR as the dependent variable and the governance indicator as the explanatory 
variable of particular interest, an OLS process is used to assess the relationship.  Control 
variables that have proven helpful in other studies are included.  Bruner (2005) provides a 
comprehensive review of the literature, which documents the importance of these control 
variables in previous research. 
 
The control variables are: 
 
1. The transaction size, as measured by the consideration paid divided by the total assets 
of the acquirer.  Previous research (Moeller et al., 2004) has shown that larger 
transactions tend to receive a cooler, or more negative, reception by market participants.  
 
2.  A dummy variable for public targets.  Previous research (Koeplin et al., 2000) has 
found that purchases of private targets are better received in the market.  The common 
interpretation is that private companies are often acquired more cheaply than public 
companies. 
 
3.  A dummy variable for cash-only consideration and a dummy variable for shares-only 
consideration.  This leaves the base case as those transactions with hybrid consideration, 
either a combination or a choice of cash and shares.  Previous research (Travlos, 1987) 
has shown that cash-only consideration is correlated with a more positive reception by 




4.  Dummy variables for each year 2001 through 2005.  This leaves 2006 as the base 
case.  Previous studies (Dong et al., 2006) have shown that merger and acquisition deals 
done in “hot markets” often result in overpayment, and a more negative reception upon 
announcement.  Hot markets are characterized by a higher quantity of transactions and by 
higher average and total dollar volume.  The amount of merger and acquisition activity in 
the economy moves in waves, with several years of high activity, or hot markets, 
followed by several years of lower activity, or cool markets. 
 
5. Dummy variables for the most popular market index in which the acquiring company 
is a member.  Brown and Caylor (2006) showed that corporate governance strength rises 
as company size increases.  Rather than using the log of total acquirer assets in this study, 
I have chosen to use market indexes that are arranged by size:  the S&P 500 for large 
capitalization companies, S&P 400 for mid-cap, S&P 600 small-cap, Russell 3000 for 
companies not within the S&P indexes, and, following the data providers lead, a 
remainder for others, called the CGQ Universe.  The premise behind this choice is that 
investors may often compare corporate governance functioning within these groupings, 
rather than on a continuum of asset size.  The data are coded so that the S&P 500 is the 
base case. 
  
The regression equation used to test hypothesis 2, the linkage between CAR and 
governance strength, with i as the subscript representing the event and ε representing the 








The regression equation used to test hypothesis 4, the linkage between target governance 
strength and CAR is similar but does not contain the public target indicator (because only 
public targets can be examined for governance) and the year 2001 and 2002 indicators 
due to data availability restrictions.  The target’s CGQ is added to the equation, and is the 
variable of interest.  To give context to the target’s CGQ, I also add the target’s index.  
The equation is: 
 
(4)     CARi=a+β1Sizei+β2Cashi+β3Sharesi+β42003i+β52004i+β62005i+ 
β7Acq Industry CGQi+β8Acq S&P 400i+β9Acq S&P 600i+β10Acq Russell 3000i+β11Acq 
CGQUniversei+β12Target Industry CGQi+β13Target S&P 400i+β14Target S&P 
600i+β15Target Russell 3000i+β16Target CGQUniversei +εi 
 
To test hypothesis 3, regarding the prediction of the target’s governance strength from the 
acquirer’s governance strength and control variables, I use a regression with the target’s 
governance strength as the dependent variable, the acquirer’s governance strength as the 
independent variable of interest, and a variety of model specifications with various 







Data Sources  
 
Merger announcement events are taken from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum 
database.  The following initial criteria are used to select the events: 
 
1.  The acquirer and the target must be US companies. 
 
2.  The acquirer must be a public company.  This criterion removes private acquirers and 
acquirers that are wholly-owned or partially-owned subsidiaries of other companies. 
 
3.  The acquirer must have SIC code 6021, national-charter commercial bank, 6022, 
state-charter commercial bank or 6029, commercial banks not elsewhere classified. 
 
4.  Announcement date must be from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2006. 
 
5.  Deal size must be at least $50 million.  This criterion eliminates deals that may be too 




6.  The transaction must have closed.  The deal status must be “Completed”. 
 
7.  There must have been a change of control of the target.  The acquirer must have held 
less than 50% of the target’s shares before the transaction, and more than 51% after 
completion.  In practice, the percentage of the target held by the acquirer almost always 
moves from 0 to 100%.  In this study all the events fit that pattern except three, which 
moved from 0 to 62%, 75% and 86%. 
 
8.  Both acquirer’s total assets and deal size values must be available.   
 
Equity prices come from the Center for Research in Security Prices database, often know 
by its acronym CRSP.  The Eventus software program from Cowan Research is used to 
access the CRSP data, perform the CAPM estimation, calculate the CARs, and generate 
some summary statistics.  Eventus is designed to facilitate event studies that use CRSP 
data as the equity price input.  The equal-weighted CRSP market index is used.  The 
CRSP PERMNO and the event date are used together to uniquely identify each event and 
to link events to the associated equity prices.   
 
After the events were identified and the equity price information was retrieved, each 
announcement event was then matched by bank name and announcement year to the 
governance data for the particular acquirer or target for the relevant year.  CUSIPs are 
also used to identify the banks in 2003 through 2006.  CUSIPs are not part of the 
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governance data for 2001 and 2002.  There were 228 events for which all initial acquirer 
data are available. 
 
To gauge the strength of corporate governance, the Industry Corporate Governance 
Quotient (CGQ) measure devised by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is used.  
This measure gives a numeric assessment to each company, ranging from 0 to 100, versus 
a comparison group of companies in the same industry.  
 
The availability of accessible governance data by company has traditionally been limited.  
The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), a commercial organization, was the 
first to gather and organize firm-level data.  Gompers et al. (2003) use these data to create 
the first widely available index, or score, of governance by company.  IRRC was 
purchased by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which collects a wider range of 
governance data.  In 2007 ISS was acquired by RiskMetrics.  In 2010 RiskMetrics was 
acquired by MSCI Barra.  For this study I actively pursued permission from the vendor to 
use the commercially-sold ISS data rather than use the more limited data in the older 
IRRC form. 
 
ISS developed its own measure of corporate governance strength called the Corporate 
Governance Quotient (CGQ).  The exact formula for the CGQ remains proprietary 
although we do know that the output of the calculation process is to rank companies from 
strongest to weakest governance.  Then each company is given the score that corresponds 
to its ranking.  For example, a company score of 25 indicates that the governance of 75% 
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of the comparison group is rated stronger.  A score of 0 (100) indicates that the company 
is the worst (best) in the comparison group.  ISS provides two CGQ values.  The “Index 
CGQ” is for comparison to companies in the same market index.  The indexes used by 
ISS are the S&P 500 (large cap), S&P 400 (mid cap), S&P 600 (small cap), Russell 3000 
(comprehensive), and a remainder to the “CGQ Universe”.  The “Industry CGQ” is for 
comparison to companies in the same industry.  Considering the 228 events that meet the 
criteria listed above, all but 12 have the Industry CGQ calculated versus the “Banks” peer 
group by ISS.  The remaining 12 are calculated versus the “Diversified Financials” peer 
group.  In this study the Industry CGQ is used and these 12 events are dropped in order to 
maintain the single-industry focus and the comparability between acquirers.  There are 







Results of the Linkage between Acquirer Governance 
and Market Reaction 
 
The data are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1:  Summary of acquisition events and acquirer and target characteristics.  
N=216     Standard 
 Mean Median Max Min Deviation 
      
CAR -0.0105 -0.0081 0.0963 -0.1264 0.035 
      
Industry CGQ 64.22 68.30 100.00 0.50 26.79 
      
Deal / Acquirer      
Total Assets, % 3.40% 1.78% 48.48% 0.02% 5.05% 
      
 Count     
Public Target 145     
Private Target 71     
      
All Cash 36     
Hybrid Payment 111     
All Stock 69     
      
Event Year      
2001 28     
2002 22     
2003 41     
2004 44     
2005 34     
2006 47     
      
Market Index      
S&P 500 62     
S&P 400 30     
S&P 600 29     
Russell 3000 86     
CGQ Universe 9     
 
In order to assess support for hypothesis 1, that mergers tend to destroy shareholder 
wealth at announcement on average, the cumulative abnormal returns must be examined 
to see if the anticipated negative market reactions are evident.  A finding of negative 
CARs would confirm hypothesis 1.  The mean cumulative abnormal return, or average 
shareholder loss attributable to the event, for the 216 events is -1.05%.  There were 79 
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events with positive CARs and 137 events with negative CARs.  Recall that the CAR is a 
difference, between the expected and actual stock return during the event window.  In 
examining the statistical significance of this difference, the null hypothesis is that the 
expected difference is zero, reflecting that the event has no impact on stock returns.  The 
large-sample, generalized sign test for this division of 79 positive and 137 negative 
results can be assessed using the formula and values below where, 
q = the quantity of negative CAR results,  
n = the number of observations, and 
p = the probability, 0.5, associated with the null hypothesis that the expected division 
between positive and negative CAR results is an even split. 
(5)                           z=(q-np)/√(np(1-p))=(137-216(0.5))/√(216(0.5)(0.5))≈ 3.9 
The test is significant at the 1% level.  I would prefer not to rely simply on the terms one-
tailed or two-tailed test.  Note that when a z-value of 3.9 is applied to one half of the 
normal distribution, it covers an area of about .4990, leaving 0.001 in the tail.  In an 
application such as this, where a result of 137 negative values implies the necessity of 79 
positive values (unless a CAR of exactly 0.00 is recorded), this amount of probability in 
each of the two tails should be combined before assessing significance.  Here, the sum of 
the two probabilities, 0.002, allows a claim of significance at the conventional 1% level. 
 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test incorporates both the sign of the difference and its level, 
and so uses more information than the generalized sign test above.  Both tests are 
nonparametric and so do not make an assumption about the underlying probability 
distribution, but the Wilcoxon test adds the assumption that the distribution is symmetric 
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around the mean (Hogg et al., 2005).  In this application the CARs are ranked by absolute 
value from lowest to highest and given a rank number from 1 to 216.  The rank number 
of the negative CARs is totaled, in this case to 15,655.  The expected value of this total 
for the null hypothesis is n(n+1)/4 and the variance is n(n+1)(2n+1)/24 (Winkler and 
Hayes, 1975).  The Z value, appropriate for large samples, is given by the formula: 
 
(6)                          z=(total negative rankings – n(n+1)/4) / √(n(n+1)(2n+1)/24)  
                                 = (15,655-216(217)/4) / √(216(217)(432+1)/24) ≈4.3 
 
This is significant at the 1% level. Clearly the results support H1 and confirm the 
observations of other researchers that on average bank merger announcements tend to 
cause a loss in the wealth of acquirer shareholders. 
 
As to whether weaker corporate governance at the firm level is associated with a greater 
destruction of shareholder wealth at announcement on average, hypothesis 2, the results 
of the OLS regression are in Table 2.   The independent variables in bold and marked 
with asterisks are significant at the 1% (***) level or stronger.  When considering the 
coefficient results, note that the average CAR is in the format of 0.0105, which represents 
1.05% of shareholder wealth.   
 
In reviewing the results for the control variables, the coefficients for the consideration 
type indicators, Cash and Shares, are extremely small and not statistically significant.  
Conversely, the coefficient for the public target indicator is significant at the 1% level.  
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At -0.01400, the coefficient for the public indicator reveals an average predicted 1.400% 
differential in shareholder wealth between transactions involving public and private 
targets.  The actual breakdown of the average CAR values for this dataset is an average 
of -0.0164 for the 145 public targets and 0.00116 for the 71 private targets.  This finding 
is consistent with the findings concerning the “private firm discount” in the literature 
regarding the general population of companies.  Capron and Shen (2007) explore this 
discount in detail as it relates to the merger activity of the general population.  Their 
results show that on average, shareholders lose more than one percent of value for 
transactions involving public targets and an average return to shareholders that is positive 
but less than one percent for transactions involving private targets. 
 
The deal size indicator is also significant at stronger than the 1% level.  One approach to 
considering the economic impact of an independent variable is to multiply its estimated 
coefficient times its standard deviation, called “Effect Size” in Sanders (2002).  For the 
deal size indicator, the coefficient of -0.19916 times the standard deviation of 0.0505 
(about 5% of acquirer total assets) would create an expected change in shareholder 
wealth of -0.1005 or -1.005% of shareholder wealth at announcement.  It is worth noting 
that this variable has a mean value of 0.0340, or 3.4% of acquirer total assets, so a 
hypothetical change of one standard deviation from the mean would have to be an 
increase in deal size, to about 8.4% of acquirer total assets, not a decrease. 
 
The dummy variables for each year yield one year in which the estimated coefficient is 
statistically significant.  The 2002 coefficient of 0.03112 was significant at the 1% level.  
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Transactions that were announced in 2002 added on average 3.112% to shareholder 
wealth over transactions that were announced in 2006.   2002 was the trough of a cool 
acquisition market, after the wild markets of the late 1990s and the bust in Spring 2000.  
It is worth remembering that acquisitions take a long time to negotiate and then 
announce, particularly transactions involving banks which may involve pre-
announcement communication with their associated regulators.    
 
The S&P 400 and S&P 600 variables fall just short of the 5% significance level, while 
the Russell 3000 variable is not significant and the CGQ Universe is significant at the 1% 
level.  Recall that the base case is the S&P 500.  Results in Table 3 show that if just an 
S&P 500 indicator is used, it is closer to the 5% significance level, with a p-value of 
0.0516.  It is just within the 5% significance level, with a p-value of 0.0473, if the 
consideration type variables Cash and Shares, which add very little and have a very high 
p-value, are eliminated from the regression.  Alternatively, if the log of total assets is 
used instead of an index indicator, it is helpful but not significant even at the 10% level.  I 
have chosen to use an indicator for each market index with the belief it is the most 
informative arrangement.   
 
The size of the coefficients indicates that transactions involving acquirers in the S&P 400 
and S&P 600 would on average receive a 1.4% better reception than acquirers in the S&P 
500.  As motivation for future research, I offer the thought that acquisitions by companies 
in these categories show a capability and willingness to move toward being included in 
the S&P500, and then gaining the associated equity lift.  Considering the CGQ Universe 
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of acquirers not listed in the other indexes, the sample size is small at 9 events, but 
perhaps these firms are garnering positive attention to their equity by making the 
acquisition.  The acquisition may also move the acquirers toward inclusion in the Russell 
3000.  
 
The explanatory variable of interest, the Industry Corporate Governance Quotient, is 
significant at the 1% level.  Recall that the CGQ is allowed to range from 0 to 100.  The 
product of one standard deviation of this variable, 26.79, times its coefficient, 0.00028, 
produces an expected effect of 0.0075 or 0.75% of shareholder wealth.  This measure of 
corporate governance quality is indicating a characteristic, or a set of characteristics, of 
the bank that is positively related to making acquisitions that are better received by 
market participants.  In reviewing these results, clearly governance matters and weak 




Table 2:  The effect of governance strength as measured by the Industry CGQ on the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR).   
 
N=216 
R Square 0.23040   
Adj R Square 0.17679   
Standard Error 0.03214   
F 4.29816   
F Significance 0.0000012   
    
 Coefficients P-value  
Intercept -0.02796 0.01464 ** 
Public Target -0.01400 0.00449 *** 
Cash 0.00149 0.81293  
Stock 0.00171 0.74414  
Deal Size -0.19916 0.00008 *** 
Industry CGQ 0.00028 0.00429 *** 
2001 0.01033 0.22178  
2002 0.03112 0.00066 *** 
2003 0.00222 0.75353  
2004 0.01069 0.12471  
2005 -0.00064 0.93065  
S&P 400 0.01412 0.05311  
S&P 600 0.01435 0.06098  
Russell 3000 0.00646 0.27271  
CGQ Universe 0.03912 0.00339 *** 
 
 *** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level 
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Table 3:  Regressions using an S&P 500 indicator or log of acquirer assets to differentiate 
acquirers.  N=216 
 
Regression results using a single S&P 500 indicator rather than individual indexes: 
 
R Square 0.19811   
Adj R Square 0.15487   
Standard Error 0.03257   
F 4.58178   
    
 Coefficients P-value  
Intercept -0.01550 0.10030  
Public Target -0.01555 0.00158 *** 
Cash 0.00021 0.97383  
Stock 0.00060 0.90908  
Deal Size -0.16407 0.00049 *** 
Industry CGQ 0.00026 0.00556 *** 
2001 0.01044 0.20614  
2002 0.03077 0.00067 *** 
2003 0.00206 0.77194  
2004 0.01062 0.13076  
2005 -0.00082 0.91218  
S&P 500 -0.01034 0.05163 * 
 
Regression results using a single S&P indicator rather than individual indexes and 
dropping the consideration type: 
    
R Square 0.19806   
Adj R Square 0.16302   
Standard Error 0.03241   
F 5.65302   
    
 Coefficients P-value  
Intercept -0.01518 0.09037 * 
Public Target -0.01555 0.00149 *** 
Deal Size -0.16404 0.00045 *** 
Industry CGQ 0.00026 0.00451 *** 
2001 0.01048 0.19575  
2002 0.03071 0.00060 *** 
2003 0.00202 0.77449  
2004 0.01069 0.12464  
2005 -0.00085 0.90756  
S&P 500 -0.01021 0.04734 ** 
 
*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level 
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Table 3, continued 
 
Regression results using log of acquirer assets instead of an index indicator 
 
R Square 0.19173   
Adj R Square 0.14815   
Standard Error 0.03270   
F 4.39920   
    
 Coefficients P-value  
Intercept 0.00489 0.75947  
Cash 0.00039 0.95123  
Stock -0.00013 0.97999  
Public Target -0.01522 0.00210 *** 
Deal Size -0.17853 0.00043 *** 
Industry CGQ 0.00026 0.00725 *** 
2001 0.00928 0.26028  
2002 0.03079 0.00073 *** 
2003 0.00223 0.75524  
2004 0.01082 0.12679  
2005 -0.00098 0.89560  
Log Assets -0.00558 0.14029  
 
Regression results using log of acquirer assets instead of an index indicator and no 
consideration type 
 
R Square 0.19171   
Adj R Square 0.15639   
Standard Error 0.03254   
F 5.42871   
    
 Coefficients P-value  
Intercept 0.00496 0.75477  
Public Target -0.01524 0.00196 *** 
Deal Size -0.17886 0.00037 *** 
Industry CGQ 0.00026 0.00532 *** 
2001 0.00937 0.24681  
2002 0.03086 0.00062 *** 
2003 0.00228 0.74756  
2004 0.01084 0.12263  
2005 -0.00094 0.89916  
Log Assets -0.00561 0.12838  
 







 Acquirer Governance Measurement and Individual 
Component Importance 
 
Thus far the CGQ has been used to represent the quality of corporate governance.  The 
precise composition of the CGQ is proprietary, but the component data has been made 
available for this study.  I now review the detailed data to gain insight into what might be 
the important drivers within it.  The dataset starts in 2001, but the 2001 and 2002 data are 
much less detailed and not directly comparable to the 2003 through 2006 data.  Therefore 
I only use the 2003 through 2006 data, for a total of 166 events.  The 50 eliminated data 
points from 2001 and 2002 represent a 23% decrease in the size of the dataset from the 
original 216. 
 
Following Aggarwal and Williamson (2006), I start with the data as it is gathered and 
arranged in 2003 and 2004.  The authors arrange the data into logical groupings, reprinted 
in Appendix 1.  I break their item numbered 33 into two separate items, one concerning 
blank check preferred stock and the other concerning poison pills, so that I have 65 items 
where they have 64.  The data for 2005 and 2006 are in a slightly different format.  I am 
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able to match most items between the 03-04 year format pair and the 05-06 year format 
pair, but 6 items must be dropped from the 03-04 pair because they do not appear in the 
later pair.  This is despite Aggarwal and Williamson identifying these items as part of 
their 2005 list.  They may have had access to data that ISS had not yet reformatted.  The 
six dropped items are in italics in the appendix list.  I also drop two items with which 
100% of the companies in the dataset comply: 
 
1. All directors attended 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse 
45. No interlocks among compensation committee members 
 
Furthermore, I drop two items with which no companies in the dataset comply:  
 
35. Poison pill with TIDE provision 
37. Poison pill with sunset provision 
 
There are 55 governance attributes remaining in the dataset.   
 
The purpose of this portion of the study is not to reverse-engineer the CGQ, but rather to 
identify the important governance practices in a bank merger context.  ISS collects its 
data in a detailed way.  As an example, there might be 5 categories of board size such as 
5 directors or less, 6 to 8 directors, 9 to 12, 13 to 15, and 16 or more, and each company 
is fit into one category.  ISS does not give a firm opinion on what is a minimum or 
acceptable strength of governance, but does publish a guide to best practices.  Using the 
40 
 
perspective within Brown and Caylor (2006), Aggarwal and Williamson (2006) and the 
ISS guide, a reasonable divide can be established between better and lesser governance 
practices.  I code each acquirer in the year of its acquisition as better or lesser (1 or 0) on 
each of the 55 attributes.  To continue with the board size example, all sizes between 6 
and 15 are coded as better, a value of 1.  A finding of less than 6, more than 15, or no 
data available is coded as lesser, a value of 0. 
 
As a first step in investigating the detailed governance information, I replace the Industry 
CGQ with a simple sum of the number of the better ratings attributed to a company.  The 
correlation between the two measures is 0.803.  The OLS regression using the CGQ has 
an adjusted R squared of 0.1803.  The same regression using the sum has an adjusted R 
squared of 0.1797, a small loss of only 0.0006, with statistical significance of the 
governance variable also little changed.  For this dataset and this application, the simple 
sum of the attributes and the CGQ are close substitutes.  Regression results using the two 




Table 4:  Comparison of regression results using Industry CGQ versus a sum of all the 
individual governance indicators that are coded as positive. 
 
N=166 Sum of Attributes 
 
CGQ 
  R Square 0.23940 
  
0.23987 
  Adj R Square 0.17974 
  
0.18026 
  Standard Error 0.03100 
  
0.03099 
  F 4.01307 
  
4.02352 









 Intercept -0.06086 0.00669 *** -0.03197 0.01627 ** 
Public Target -0.01404 0.01049 ** -0.01333 0.01503 ** 
Cash -0.00253 0.73034 
 
-0.00023 0.97503 
 Stock -0.00250 0.65980 
 
-0.00061 0.91537 
 Deal Size -0.20242 0.00006 *** -0.20529 0.00005 *** 
2003 0.01044 0.18696 
 
0.00291 0.67186 
 2004 0.01700 0.02118 ** 0.01210 0.07511 * 
2005 0.00120 0.86829 
 
0.00003 0.99692 
 S&P 400 0.00999 0.26650 
 
0.01065 0.23721 
 S&P 600 0.01909 0.02754 ** 0.01978 0.02345 ** 
Russell 3000 0.00753 0.24902 
 
0.00847 0.20289 
 CGQ Universe 0.04130 0.00212 *** 0.04142 0.00206 *** 
Sum of Attributes 0.00173 0.00452 *** 
  Industry CGQ 
   
0.00032 0.00429 *** 
       
 
Std Deviation Effect Size 
   Sum of Attributes 5.3411 0.00922 
    Industry CGQ 26.0782 0.00823 
     
*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level 
 
 
I next use the investigation procedure in Brown and Caylor (2006), who use ISS 
governance data to investigate the linkage between governance strength and firm value 
represented by Tobin’s q.  The procedure is to use three methods to identify the variables 
within the 55 that seem to be the most important.  Variables that are highlighted in at 
least two of the three methods are then combined into an index.  Brown and Caylor’s 
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work results in an index of 7 variables.  The first one is not usable in my dataset because 
all the acquiring banks meet this criterion.  The item in italics is not available in my 
dataset because it is not included in the 2005 and 2006 data. 
  1. All directors attended 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse 
13. Governance guidelines are publicly disclosed 
14. Annually elected board (no staggered board) 
15. Directors are subject to stock ownership requirements 
33b. Company either has no poison pill or a pill that was shareholder approved 
47. No option repricing within last three years 
53. Options grants align with company performance and reasonable burn rate 
 
I refer to the usable 5 items as the BC5 index.  It is not particularly good as a 
representation of the entire governance dataset in this bank merger application.  A 
regression using this BC5 index as the independent variable of interest produces an 
adjusted R squared of 0.13569, notably lower than that of the full sum, 0.1797.  Full 




Table 5:  Regression results substituting the BC5 index, similar to the Gov-7 index from 
Brown and Caylor (2006), for the industry CGQ. 
 
  N=166 
R Square 0.19855   
Adj R Square 0.13569   
Standard Error 0.03182   
F 3.15859   
    
 Coefficients P-value  
Intercept -0.00262 0.78438  
Public Target -0.01396 0.01315 ** 
Cash 0.00090 0.90388  
Stock -0.00394 0.49789  
Deal Size -0.20611 0.00007 *** 
2003 -0.00205 0.77155  
2004 0.00718 0.33387  
2005 -0.00282 0.69895  
S&P 400 0.00870 0.34666  
S&P 600 0.01293 0.14466  
Russell 3000 0.00124 0.84851  
CGQ Universe 0.03017 0.02417 ** 
BC5 0.00087 0.77158  
 
*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level 
 
The first of the three approaches is to replace the CGQ with all of the 55 data items 
together.  Unlike Brown and Caylor (2006), I find no governance variables to be 
significant at the 5% level in this approach. 
 
The second approach is a stepwise regression, often an informative technique in its own 
right.  I find three variables to be significant at the 5% level.  They are: 
3. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors 
30. Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws (not supermajority) 




The third approach is to replace the CGQ with one governance variable and a summed 
index of the remaining 54 items.  This is done 55 times, in 55 separate regressions, for 
each variable in turn.  I find 5 variables to be significant at the 5% level.  They include: 
30. Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws (not supermajority) 
33b. Company either has no poison pill or a pill that was shareholder approved 
39. Company has no pill or state does not endorse poison pills 
53. Options grants align with company performance and reasonable burn rate 
59. Directors are required to submit resignation upon a change in job 
 
In this study, the intersection of the results of the three approaches yields two variables 
that are highlighted in the second and third approaches.  They are: 
30. Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws (not supermajority) (34% of 
sample) 
39. Company has no pill or state does not endorse poison pills (80% of sample) 
 
An index composed of the sum of these two items has only 3 possible outcomes: 0 
(15.7%), 1 (54.8%) and 2 (29.5%), thereby dividing the acquirers into high medium and 
low governance strength.  The regression using this two-factor index as a replacement for 
the 55-factor index or the CGQ, shown in Table 6, produces an adjusted R squared of 




Table 6:  Regression results using a two-factor index to represent governance strength. 
N=166 
R Square 0.29419   
Adj R Square 0.23883   
Standard Error 0.02986   
F 5.31435   
    
 Coefficients P-value  
Intercept -0.02011 0.01960 ** 
Public Target -0.01379 0.00912 *** 
Cash -0.00046 0.94697  
Stock -0.00133 0.80859  
Deal Size -0.21847 0.00001 *** 
2003 -0.00243 0.70642  
2004 0.00806 0.20742  
2005 -0.00045 0.94722  
S&P 400 0.00654 0.44946  
S&P 600 0.01243 0.11947  
Russell 3000 0.00081 0.88986  
CGQ Universe 0.02900 0.01748 ** 
two-factor index 0.01635 0.00001 *** 
    
*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level 
 
 
In interpreting these results, it may first be helpful to make the common distinction 
between external and internal governance attributes.  External attributes relate to the 
amount of power  outsiders to the company could exert.  Internal attributes relate to how 
leadership decisions are made, including in areas such as corporate strategy, 
compensation, tenure, and the deployment of company resources.   
 
External attributes primarily come into play as defenses against proxy fights and against 
hostile takeovers.  Defenses against proxy fights might include staggered 3-year terms for 
board members rather than having members stand for election or re-election annually, 
making it difficult for shareholders to call or introduce proposals at shareholder’s 
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meeting, and not having shareholder cumulative voting rights.  Defenses against hostile 
takeovers include poison pills, incorporation in a takeover-hostile state, and requiring a 
supermajority vote to approve mergers.  The IRRC data, which I chose not to use in this 
study, is composed of 24 governance attributes, most of which are external.   
 
Poison pills are a particularly potent anti-takeover defense, which can indicate weak 
governance.  Note that the Brown and Caylor’s (2006) list of 7 key attributes only 
contains two external attributes, one regarding poison pills and the other regarding annual 
election of board members.  Recall that there are fewer hostile mergers in the banking 
industry than in the general corporate population.  The existence of poison pills is a 
relevant governance attribute in both friendly and hostile takeovers, requiring that the 
selling management remove the pill so that the merger can proceed.  In contrast, proxy 
fights are by definition a hostile tactic.  Therefore it is not surprising that a poison pill 
attribute would be a particularly important external governance attribute in a bank merger 
context, and that annual election of directors would be less important.   
 
The Brown and Caylor (2006) study highlighted the importance of the ISS data item:  
33b - Company has no pill or a pill that was shareholder approved.  This bank merger 
study reveals the importance of:  39 - Company has no pill or state does not endorse 
poison pills.  Note that many banks are state-chartered and state-regulated.  Although 
state banks do sometimes change their state of incorporation (sometimes via a merger), it 
may be the case that banks tend to be less inclined to change their state of incorporation 
than companies in the general population.  Therefore the state’s legal environment 
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regarding mergers may play more prominently into the effectiveness of external defenses.  
It also may be the case that states that do not endorse poison pills may be less inclined to 
support other anti-takeover measures.   
 
One benefit of the ISS data is the large amount of detail on internal governance practices 
that had been difficult to access in the past.  The other governance attribute that has been 
found to be particularly important in this study is:  30 - Majority vote requirement to 
amend charter/bylaws.  This is clearly a critical internal attribute, relating to how the 
leaders of the organization are elected, constrained, and possibly removed.  I would 
suggest that it also serves as an external attribute in that it allows a majority of 
shareholders to disassemble any anti-proxy fight defenses, perhaps at the urging of a 
corporate raider.  It certainly is important to ease corporate restructuring – of selling the 
company in whole or in parts, or completely changing the location or focus of the bank, 
or changing its management.  Taken together, the two attributes found in this study to be 
most related to the market reception of the announcement of a bank merger are key 
measures of management entrenchment, a critical concept in this line of research (e.g. 









Thus far the focus of this study has been the governance strength and detailed governance 
attributes of the acquirer.  In this section I investigate the association between the market 
reaction at announcement and the overall governance strength and detailed attributes of 
the target.  Of the 216 events used in the earliest sections, there was ISS governance 
coverage of only a portion the targets, which are typically much smaller than the 
acquirers.  Sixty targets that were independent entities had data available the year of the 
announcement.  Fifteen more had an ultimate parent entity for which data were available 
in the year of the announcement, for a total of 75.  Another 19 were independent entities 
that did not have data available in the year of the announcement but had it available in the 
prior year.  The majority of these transactions were announced early in their respective 
year of announcement, suggesting that coverage for that year was not further pursued by 
ISS.  Thus the total was 94 targets with governance data.  Of these 91 were classified as 
banks by ISS and 3 were classified in other industries.  I dropped these 3 for the benefit 
of working with a single target industry.  Of the 91 remaining observations, one is from 
2001, three from 2002 and one is in 2003 but relies on 2002 data.  The 2001 and 2002 
data contain CGQ figures but have much less detail regarding the component governance 
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attributes.  I choose to drop these 5 observations so that the analysis of the detailed 
attributes to follow can be directly compared to the overall results that make use of the 




Table 7:  Summary of the data used to examine target governance and its effect on 
acquirer shareholder wealth at announcement of a merger. 
 
     
Standard 
N=86 Mean Median Max Min Deviation 
      CAR -0.0192 -0.0137 0.0766 -0.1264 0.0340 
      Acquirer Industry 
CGQ 70.26 77.00 100.00 0.50 25.99 
Target Industry CGQ 59.36 61.85 100.00 0.50 25.71 
      Deal / Acquirer 
     Total Assets, % 4.83% 2.50% 48.48% 0.02% 7.13% 
      
 
Count 
    
      All Cash 10 
    Hybrid Payment 46 
    All Stock 30 
    
      Event Year 
     2003 16 
    2004 30 
    2005 14 
    2006 26 
    
      Acquirer Market 
Index 
     S&P 500 36 
    S&P 400 9 
    S&P 600 11 
    Russell 3000 30 
    CGQ Universe 5 
    
      Target Market Index 
     S&P 500 8 
    S&P 400 5 
    S&P 600 4 
    Russell 3000 25 
    CGQ Universe 44 
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Knowing that smaller entities tend to have weaker governance structures (Aggarwal and 
Williamson 2006), we would expect the target group to have lower summary governance 
scores.  The data show this with a median CGQ of 77.00 for the acquirers and 61.85 for 
the targets.  Also, an inspection of the data at the detail level, rather than the summary 
level, reveals that 51 of the 86 have an acquirer CGQ higher than the target.   
 
Knowing that these targets are public entities, or have public ultimate parents, we would 
expect a lower average CAR and the data display this.  The average CAR of the 216 
original events was -1.05% and this subset group of public banks buying public banks (or 
from a public parent) has an average CAR of -1.92%.   
 
The correlation between the industry CGQ of the acquirers and that of the targets is 0.29.    
These data suggest that there is a tendency for acquirers with stronger governance to 
acquire targets with stronger governance.  Of course larger acquirers tend to purchase 
larger targets, which could be a part of this correlation.  I do a series of regressions with 
acquirer CGQ as the independent variable of interest, various control variables, and target 
CGQ as the dependent variable.  Under all specifications of the model, the acquirer CGQ 
is always significant at either the 1% or 5% level.  Results are listed in Table 8.  The 
results show that in the context of this dataset, public US banks purchasing public US 
banks (or from a public parent), acquirers with stronger governance tend to choose targets 
with stronger governance.  Hypothesis 3, that acquirers with stronger governance tend to 
acquirer entities with weaker governance, is not supported.  Indeed, the opposite is shown 
to be true.  One implication may be that the cost-benefit tradeoff of bringing stronger 
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governance to an entity in a different, often weaker, regulatory environment (cross-border 
mergers) may be distinctly different from the cost-benefit tradeoffs of bringing a US bank 
with weak governance up to a stronger level of governance.   
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Table 8:  Regression results using target CGQ as the dependent variable.  The three 
regressions on the left do not include deal size.  Lower regressions include more control 
variables. 
  N=86 
R Square 0.08371 
   
R Square 0.10087 
  Adj R Square 0.07280 
   
Adj R Square 0.07921 
  F 7.67416 
   
F 4.65587 
  F Significance 0.00689 
   
F Significance 0.01212 
           
 
Coefficients P-value 
   
Coefficients P-value 
 Intercept 39.25266 0.00000 *** 
 
Intercept 35.30006 0.00006 *** 
Acq Ind CGQ 0.28618 0.00689 *** 
 
Deal Size 47.97186 0.21168 
           Acq Ind CGQ 0.30946 0.00403 *** 
         R Square 0.26035 
   
R Square 0.26859 
  Adj R Square 0.17276 
   
Adj R Square 0.17107 
  F 2.97240 
   
F 2.75417 
  F Significance 0.00440 
   
F Significance 0.00603 
           
 
Coefficients P-value 
   
Coefficients P-value 
 Intercept 58.54898 0.00002 *** 
 
Intercept 57.28072 0.00004 *** 
Acq Ind CGQ 0.28277 0.01615 ** 
 
Deal Size 40.51848 0.36099 
 Acq S&P 400 10.14348 0.27915 
  
Acq Ind CGQ 0.28109 0.01692 ** 
Acq S&P 600 4.28206 0.65492 
  
Acq S&P 400 10.05946 0.28368 
 Acq Russell 20.08204 0.00857 *** 
 
Acq S&P 600 2.67392 0.78382 
 Acq CGQ Univ 1.28833 0.92024 
  
Acq Russell 17.79711 0.02631 ** 
Trgt S&P 400 -14.62965 0.28064 
  
Acq CGQ Univ -5.59654 0.70758 
 Trgt S&P 600 -31.27442 0.03714 ** 
 
Trgt S&P 400 -17.01933 0.21886 
 Trgt Russell -27.35698 0.00998 *** 
 
Trgt S&P 600 -31.14174 0.03817 ** 
Trgt CGQ Univ -34.18158 0.00149 *** 
 
Trgt Russell -27.29163 0.01025 ** 
          Trgt CGQ Univ -32.31573 0.00311 *** 
         R Square 0.28610 
   
R Square 0.29103 
  Adj R Square 0.14533 
   
Adj R Square 0.13910 
  F 2.03241 
   
F 1.91561 
  F Significance 0.02698 
   
F Significance 0.03592 
           
 
Coefficients P-value 
   
Coefficients P-value 
 Intercept 51.20163 0.00199 *** 
 
Intercept 51.38588 0.00201 *** 
Acq Ind CGQ 0.33838 0.00971 *** 
 
Deal Size 32.06272 0.48789 
 Acq S&P 400 11.05174 0.25664 
  
Acq Ind CGQ 0.33109 0.01190 ** 
Acq S&P 600 5.30535 0.60087 
  




Acq Russell 20.37071 0.01043 ** 
 
Acq S&P 600 3.68321 0.72419 
 Acq CGQ Univ 2.24962 0.86767 
  
Acq Russell 18.37978 0.02963 *** 
Trgt S&P 400 -16.35008 0.24631 
  
Acq CGQ Univ -3.62443 0.82050 
 Trgt S&P 600 -30.02674 0.05395 * 
 
Trgt S&P 400 -18.24608 0.20613 
 Trgt Russell -25.67110 0.02066 ** 
 
Trgt S&P 600 -30.10795 0.05423 * 
Trgt CGQ Univ -32.44469 0.00397 *** 
 
Trgt Russell -25.79063 0.02059 ** 
2003 -0.62257 0.93750 
  
Trgt CGQ Univ -30.96604 0.00698 *** 
2004 3.75776 0.58425 
  
2003 -0.82323 0.91777 
 2005 0.00870 0.99917 
  
2004 3.20463 0.64409 
 Cash -8.04003 0.36132 
  
2005 -0.33780 0.96813 
 Stock 4.18418 0.50182 
  
Cash -8.28765 0.34898 
 
     
Stock 3.50016 0.58012 
  
*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level 
 
I next seek to examine the effects of target governance strength, and the difference 
between acquirer and target governance strength, on acquirer equity prices at 
announcement.  I add the target governance to the regression model used to predict the 
market reaction for the complete dataset of 216 events.  I drop the public target indicator 
since all companies followed by ISS are public.  I also add the target’s index group as a 
control variable, cognizant of the fact that it also represents the absolute size of the target.  
I believe that it is different enough from the relative deal size indicator in the model 
which is deal size / acquirer’s total assets.  Results of the regression are shown in Table 9.  
At 0.0022 the coefficient on the target’s CGQ is about half of that on the acquirer’s, 
0.0050.  Recall that both have about the same standard deviation of approximately 26, so 
that a change of one standard deviation in the target’s governance measure would have 
just under half the effect of a one standard deviation change in the acquirer’s governance 
measure.  Although the coefficient on the target’s CGQ is not significant at conventional 
levels, it does have a p-value of 0.147, lending some evidence to the notion that investors 
are more pleased with targets with strong governance than with weak governance.  This 
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is different from the result in the literature in which, regarding cross-border mergers, the 
market seemed to penalize the acquirer less the lower the governance strength of the 




Table 9:  Results of the regression including the target’s governance strength and target 
index as a set of control variables. 
 
N=86 
   R Square 0.36319 
  Adj R Square 0.21552 
  Standard Error 0.03014 
  F 3.06552 
  F Significance 0.00524 
  
    
 
Coefficients P-value 
 Intercept -0.07718 0.00067 *** 
Size -0.22077 0.00032 *** 
Acq S&P 400 0.00732 0.55599 
 Acq S&P 600 0.02295 0.08528 * 
Acq Russell 3000 0.00974 0.37128 
 Acq CGQ Univ 0.04962 0.01613 ** 
Acq Industry 
CGQ 0.00050 0.00410 *** 
Target S&P 400 0.00351 0.84823 
 Target S&P 600 -0.02278 0.25750 
 Target Russell 
3000 0.00499 0.72805 
 Target CGQ Univ 0.00481 0.74675 
 Trgt Industry 
CGQ 0.00022 0.14678 
 2003 0.00917 0.36433 
 2004 0.01258 0.15455 
 2005 0.00094 0.92984 
 Cash 0.00267 0.81158 
 Stock 0.00165 0.83694 
  
*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level 
 
 
Because the difference between the acquirer’s CGQ and the target’s CGQ is a linear 
function of the two, replacing the target’s CGQ with the difference in the regression does 
not produce additional insight.  A regression using neither the target’s nor the acquirer’s 
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CGQ, but only the difference, reprinted in Table 10, produces an extremely small 




Table 10:  Results of a regression examining the effect of the difference between the 
target and acquirer CGQ on acquirer shareholder wealth at announcement. 
 
N=86 
   R Square 0.23009 
  Adj R Square 0.06511 
  Standard Error 0.03291 
  F 1.39463 
  F Significance 0.17446 
  
    
 
Coefficients P-value 
 Intercept -0.00983 0.47185 
 Deal Size -0.19577 0.00282 *** 
Cash 0.00390 0.74993 
 Stock -0.00295 0.73283 
 2003 0.00142 0.89537 
 2004 0.00705 0.45604 
 2005 -0.00638 0.57877 
 Acq S&P 400 0.00747 0.58212 
 Acq S&P 600 0.00970 0.48572 
 Acq Russell 0.00216 0.85312 
 Acq CGQ Univ 0.02469 0.23819 
 Target S&P 400 -0.00190 0.92422 
 Target S&P 600 -0.03393 0.11979 
 Target Russell -0.00690 0.65181 
 Target CGQ Univ -0.00466 0.77121 
 CGQ difference 0.00008 0.56032 
  
*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level 
 
Finally I attempt to examine the question by using both the levels of the two CGQs and 
the difference between them when they are formatted as standardized variables.  This 
difference is the number of standard deviations one variable is from its mean minus the 
number of standard deviations that the other variable is from its mean.  Recall that the 
standard deviations of the two variables are almost the same.  The results, not presented, 




These results show that hypothesis 4 is not supported.  Weaker governance at the target is 
not associated with less destruction of shareholder wealth.  In fact the opposite 
conclusion is suggested, although not at statistical significance.  US bank targets with 
stronger governance may be more attractive targets for acquirers.  Perhaps one reason for 
the lack of statistical significance is the sample size.  Statistical significance might 
emerge in future research with a larger sample size. 
 
Next I examine the detailed data regarding the individual governance attributes of the 
targets to see if there are attributes that are particularly meaningful to the market at the 
time of a merger announcement.  I again follow the Brown and Caylor (2006) procedure 
for examining the detail target governance attribute data, similar to the process performed 
above for the acquirers.  This procedure involves putting the data through three statistical 
procedures and then focusing on attributes that at least two of the procedures designate as 
significant.   
 
The first procedure is to replace the target CGQ with all 55 of the detailed attributes and 
see which, if any, are significant at the 5% level.  The result is two attributes: 
2. CEO serves on the boards of two or fewer public companies  
5. CEO is not listed as having a related-party transaction 
 
 
Note that #2 is given a negative coefficient, -0.181, suggesting that for these small 
companies, a CEO that is more connected to other public companies may be have 




The second procedure is a stepwise regression which includes the 55 attributes.  Six 
attributes are found to be significant: 
3. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors 
16. Executives are subject to stock ownership guidelines    
17. Policy exists on outside directorships (four or fewer boards is the limit) 
31. Poison pill with a trigger >= 20% 
33b. Company has no pill or a pill that was shareholder approved 
49. All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval 
The third procedure is to perform 55 separate regressions and in each one use one 
attribute on a stand-alone basis and also use an index of the sum of the remaining 54.  
Five attributes are found to be significant using this procedure: 
17. Policy exists on outside directorships (four or fewer boards is the limit) 
28. Majority vote requirement to approve mergers (not supermajority) 
49. All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval  
50. The last time shareholders voted on an option plan, ISS deemed the cost reasonable 
52. Repricing prohibited 
 
The intersection of the results of these three procedures produces two attributes: 
17. Policy exists on outside directorships (four or fewer boards is the limit) 
49. All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval 
Each attribute is satisfied by 8 banks in the sample (9.3% each) and there is no overlap, 
so 70 banks of the 86 do not satisfy either.  A regression using this two-factor index as 
representative of what might be received positively by market participants at the time of 




Table 11:  Results of a regression using a sum of target attributes number 17 and 49 as 
the indicator of target governance strength. 
N=86 
   R Square 0.39775 
  Adj R Square 0.25810 
  Standard Error 0.02732 
  F 2.84821 
  F Significance 0.00136 
  
    
 
Coefficients P-value 
 Intercept -0.06332 0.00097 
 Size -0.23085 0.00004 *** 
Acq S&P 400 0.00765 0.49400 
 Acq S&P 600 0.01689 0.16732 
 Acq Russell 3000 0.01887 0.05237 
 Acq CGQ Univ 0.04485 0.01803 ** 
Acq Industry CGQ 0.00046 0.00312 *** 
Target S&P 400 -0.00028 0.98655 
 Target S&P 600 -0.03927 0.03171 ** 
Target Russell 3000 -0.00290 0.82667 
 Target CGQ Univ -0.00772 0.57555 
 17+49 0.00347 0.71065 
 2003 0.02226 0.01792 ** 
2004 0.01416 0.07963 
 2005 0.01646 0.09264 
 Cash 0.01126 0.26984 
 Stock 0.00622 0.40672 
  
*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level 
 
 
Overall, this dataset does not yield statistically conclusive evidence about target 
governance playing a role in changes in acquirer shareholder wealth at the time of a 
merger announcement between US public banks.  The dataset does definitively depict a 
pattern of acquirers with strong governance tending to select targets with strong 
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governance, the opposite of H3, and it does suggest that market participants may be 
viewing mergers involving targets with stronger governance more favorably at the time 









In this section I perform a robustness check of the major results of the study by replacing 
the CRSP equal-weighted market return index with the Datastream US Bank total return 
index.  By moving from an overall market index to an industry sector index, the effects of 
industry trends and shocks are brought to bear on the results.   
 
My first step is to retrieve the raw CRSP data.  I then manually reproduce the work done 
up to this point by Eventus to create the CAR values, using the CRSP equal-weighted 
market index to represent market movements.  My calculated results match the Eventus 
results exactly.  I then repeat the CAR calculations using the same raw stock return data 
but the Datastream US Bank total return index instead of the CRSP market index.  A 




Table 12:  A comparison of the CAR values created using the CRSP equal-weighted 
market index and using the Datastream US Bank total return index. 
N=216 















    Mean -0.0108 
 
-0.0105 
    Maximum 0.0853 
 
0.0963 
    Minimum -0.1264 * -0.1264 
    Standard 
   Deviation 0.0313 * 0.0313 
    Number 
   Negative 144 
 
137 




    * These numbers are equal simply by coincidence 
The two minimums are not the same event 
 
 
The first hypothesis of this study, H1, that bank mergers tend to destroy shareholder 
wealth at announcement on average, is upheld.  The average CAR using the bank index is 
-1.08% versus -1.05% for the overall market index.  The number of negative results is 
144, two thirds of the sample, and is farther from the null hypothesis of an even split than 
the 137 negative results using the market index.  Using the generalized sign test this 




The second hypothesis, H2, that weaker corporate governance at the firm level is 
associated with greater destruction of shareholder wealth at announcement on average, is 
(re)examined via regressing the CAR on the governance indicator, the CGQ, and control 
variables.  The results are shown in Table 13.  The CGQ of the acquirer remains 
statistically significant with the new index, although at the 5% rather than the 1% level.  




Table 13:  Results of regressing the cumulative abnormal return, CAR, on the governance 
strength indicator of the firm, the CGQ, and control variables.  One regression uses the 
CRSP equal-weighted index to represent the market movements and the other uses the 
Datastream US Bank total return index. 
 
Datastream US 
   
CRSP Equal-Weighted 
N=216 Bank Index 
  
N=216 Market Index 
 R Square 0.23308 
   
R Square 0.2304  
Adj R Square 0.17966 
   
Adj R Square 0.17679   
Standard 
Error 0.02836 
   
Standard 
Error 0.03214   
F 4.36341 
   
F 4.29816   F 
Significance 9E-07 
   
F 
Significance 1.2E-06   




 Coefficients P-value  
Intercept -0.02300 0.02273 ** 
 
Intercept -0.02796 0.01464 ** 
Public 
Target -0.01509 0.00055 *** 
 
Public 
Target -0.014 0.00449 *** 
Cash 0.00204 0.71489 
  
Cash 0.00149 0.81293  
Stock 0.00477 0.30350 
  
Stock 0.00171 0.74414  
Deal Size -0.19466 0.00001 *** 
 
Deal Size -0.19916 0.00008 *** 
Industry 
CGQ 0.00018 0.03559 ** 
 
Industry 
CGQ 0.00028 0.00429 *** 
2001 0.01594 0.03332 ** 
 
2001 0.01033 0.22178  
2002 0.02450 0.00230 *** 
 
2002 0.03112 0.00066 *** 
2003 0.00749 0.22984 
  
2003 0.00222 0.75353  
2004 0.00783 0.20234 
  
2004 0.01069 0.12471  
2005 0.00439 0.50019 
  
2005 -0.00064 0.93065  
S&P 400 0.01217 0.05892 
  
S&P 400 0.01412 0.05311  
S&P 600 0.00998 0.13889 
  
S&P 600 0.01435 0.06098  
Russell 3000 0.00758 0.14489 
  
Russell 3000 0.00646 0.27271  
CGQ 
Universe 0.03235 0.00596 *** 
 
CGQ 
Universe 0.03912 0.00339 *** 
 




The third hypothesis, H3, that acquirers with stronger governance tend to acquire entities 
with weaker governance, is not reexamined because the testing of the hypothesis does not 
make use of the CAR values.  Recall that the finding was just the opposite of the stated 
hypothesis and was statistically significant.  Acquirers with strong governance tend to 
choose targets with strong governance. 
 
The fourth hypothesis, H4, is that targets with weaker governance strength are associated 
with less destruction of shareholder wealth at announcement.  The finding was the 
opposite of the stated hypothesis but was not statistically significant, only statistically 
suggestive.  Switching to the bank index does not improve the statistical significance of 
the results.  In fact the relevant p-value is slightly larger using the bank index, moving 
from 0.147 to 0.192.  The results, shown in Table 14, suggest that targets with weaker 





Table 14:  Results of regressing CAR values on the governance strength indicators, 
CGQs, of both the acquirer and the targets, and on control variables.  The two sets of 
results use two different market indexes to create the CAR values. 
 
Datastream US 
   
CRSP Equal-Weighted 
N=86 Bank Index 
  
N=86 Market Index 
 R Square 0.41136 
   
R Square 0.36319 
  Adj R Square 0.27487 
   
Adj R Square 0.21552 
  Standard Error 0.02701 
   
Standard Error 0.03014 
  F 3.01374 
   
F 3.06552 
  F Significance 0.00077 
   
F Significance 0.00524 
  
         
 
Coefficients P-value 
   
Coefficients P-value 
 Intercept -0.07209 0.00041 *** 
 
Intercept -0.07718 0.00067 *** 
Size -0.23721 0.00002 *** 
 
Size -0.22077 0.00032 *** 
Acq S&P 400 0.00588 0.59752 
  
Acq S&P 400 0.00732 0.55599 
 Acq S&P 600 0.01703 0.15272 ** 
 
Acq S&P 600 0.02295 0.08528 * 
Acq Russell 3000 0.01604 0.10270 
  
Acq Russell 
3000 0.00974 0.37128 
 Acq CGQ Univ 0.04672 0.01164 ** 
 
Acq CGQ Univ 0.04962 0.01613 ** 
Acq Ind CGQ 0.00042 0.00728 *** 
 
Acq Ind CGQ 0.00050 0.00410 *** 
Target S&P 400 0.00293 0.85829 
  
Target S&P 400 0.00351 0.84823 
 Target S&P 600 -0.03512 0.05353 
  
Target S&P 600 -0.02278 0.25750 
 
Trgt Russell 3000 0.00010 0.99375 
  
Trgt Russell 
3000 0.00499 0.72805 
 
Target CGQ Univ -0.00408 0.75988 
  
Target CGQ 
Univ 0.00481 0.74675 
 Trgt Ind CGQ 0.00018 0.19188 
  
Trgt Ind CGQ 0.00022 0.14678 
 2003 0.02286 0.01329 
  
2003 0.00917 0.36433 
 2004 0.01392 0.07988 
  
2004 0.01258 0.15455 
 2005 0.01660 0.08620 
  
2005 0.00094 0.92984 
 Cash 0.01234 0.22222 
  
Cash 0.00267 0.81158 
 Stock 0.00630 0.38135 
  
Stock 0.00165 0.83694 
  
*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level 
 
Overall the results using the bank index are close to those using the overall market index, 









The academic literature reveals that on average shareholders of banks either lose wealth 
or do not increase it upon the announcement of an acquisition.   Academics have 
speculated that the reason this acquisition behavior continues is that shareholders have a 
difficult time controlling, or governing, their agents.  Other academic research has 
documented the compensation incentives for CEOs to make acquisitions.  This study asks 
whether we can determine that weak governance structures at the firm level are correlated 
with, and thus may contribute to, the selection of acquisitions that are more poorly 
received by market participants.   
 
A unique dataset combining merger events with equity price movements and 
commercially-sold governance assessments was created to investigate the question.  With 
statistically significant results, the finding is that stronger corporate governance by 





An investigation is done to examine which governance attributes seem to be the most 
closely associated with the equity market reception of a merger announcement.  The 
surprising result is that an index of only two of the 55 variables carries at least the 
explanatory power of indexes containing all 55 attributes in this bank merger context.   
 
Additionally, where governance data are available for the targets that are banks, it is 
examined for an association to the market reaction to the merger announcement.  It is also 
examined to discern which governance attributes may seem to be the most important in 
influencing the market reaction.  The results indicate that acquirers with relatively 
stronger governance tend to select targets with relatively stronger governance.  The 
results also somewhat suggest that market participants react more favorably to merger 






Aggarwal and Williamson (2006) presented the detailed ISS data organized as below.  I 
have compiled the data in the same way for the 216 acquiring banks in this study.  I show 
Aggarwal and Williamson’s 2003 and 2005 data from a broad range of companies, 
excluding financial companies, for comparison.  I do not have 2005 and 2006 data for the 
items in italics.   I have divided item 33 into its two component parts.  The items that 
have 100% or 0% compliance will not be used in further regression analysis. 
 
































































6. No former CEO on the board  






































10. Outsider controlled board or board controlled by 50% to 75% of independent 




















































Appendix 1, continued 













































18. Shareholders have cumulative voting rights  




























21. Director term limits exist  





    22. Board controlled by 50% or more independent outsiders and all committees are 
comprised solely of independent outsiders 
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Appendix 1, continued 

















       27. Single class, common  


















29. Shareholders may call special meetings  


















31. Poison pill with a trigger >= 20%  









32. Shareholder may act by written consent  









33. Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred and either has no 






    33a. Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred 
 




33b. Company has no pill or a pill that was shareholder approved 
 
     
66% 
  34. Poison pill with a qualified offer clause  









35. Poison pill with TIDE provision  









36. Board cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval or can only do so 
under limited 
circumstances 









37. Poison pill with sunset provision  











Appendix 1, continued 

















       38. Incorporation in state w/o a control share cash-out statute, or with a control 




















40. Incorporation in a state without stakeholder laws, or independent directors 
comprise 75% or more of the board 









41. Incorporation in state w/o a control share acquisition statue, or with a control 




















43. Incorporation in state w/o a freezeout provision, or with a freezeout but 
company has opted out 





















Appendix 1, continued 



























































50. The last time shareholders voted on an option plan, ISS deemed the cost 
reasonable 














    52. Repricing prohibited  


















54. Company expenses stock options  
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60. Mandatory retirement age for directors  





    
        OWNERSHIP 
       61. Does not ignore shareholder proposal  



















63. Officers’ and directors’ stock ownership is at least 1% but not over 30% of total 
shares 
outstanding 
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